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Abstract
This reflection explores how emotion shapes lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) rights and law
reforms. Drawing on case studies from Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the author maps how
disgust regulates sexuality, hate manifests in hate crime penalties, anger arises in anti-discrimination measures, fear
polices refugee law, anxiety shapes trans children’s access to medical transition, pity and compassion inhibit intersex
autonomy, and love enables marriage equality. Legal scholars, activists, lawyers, and judges need to take emotion
seriously to better address the pressing challenges facing LGBTI people.
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Why does disgust compel us to police certain sexual
practices? How do we address violence motivated by
hate? What can anger achieve in law reform designed
to address discrimination and inequality? How do fears
and anxieties shape the way law controls borders and
bodies? Why do courts turn to love when dealing with
relationship recognition? These are a few questions I’ve
been thinking about lately as part of my advocacy on
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex
(LGBTI)1 human rights.
Campaigns for LGBTI legal equality generate strong
feelings, particularly among the scholars, activists, law-
yers and judges who are invested in their outcomes.
Yet, while many of us have acknowledged the emotions
(including joy, hope, fear, despair, frustration) that law
makes us feel personally, few of us have thought seriously
about the emotional grammar of law and how that gram-
mar makes LGBTI rights possible in the first place.
Emotion is not ‘queer’ to law – it is an essential part of
a legal landscape that makes theorising, legislating, litigat-
ing, adjudicating and affirming rights possible.
This reflection tries to illuminate some of that dispa-
rate landscape by mapping how emotion shapes the ways
that LGBTI rights and reforms are progressed, chal-
lenged and affirmed in a few common law jurisdictions
and subdisciplines of law.2
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1Intersex rights emerge alongside, and distinct from, LGBTrights and law reform projects. ‘LGBT’ is sometimes used instead of ‘LGBTI’ in this work to
indicate that the law reform or legal debate does not explicitly include intersex people.
2This reflection draws on material I have published elsewhere. See Senthorun Raj, Feeling Queer Jurisprudence: Injury, Intimacy, Identity (Routledge, 2020);
Senthorun Raj, ‘Alleviating Anxiety and Cultivating Care: Young Trans People in the Family Court of Australia’ (2019) 45(1) Australian Feminist Law
Journal 111; Senthorun Raj, ‘How Indian Judges Wrote Love into Law as They Decriminalised Gay Sex’, The Conversation (10 September 2018) https://th
econversation.com/how-indian-judges-wrote-love-into-law-as-they-decriminalised-gay-sex-102810.
Emotion, seriously?!
Most lawyers and judges balk at the mention of emotion.
Of course, they recognise emotions exist. But law, in a
professional’s imagination, is about reason and objectiv-
ity. It is a set of rules that can be applied dispassionately
in courts to resolve disputes that may be highly emotion-
al. But emotion is not confined to the frustrations of
parties to a contractual dispute, the trauma of victims
in a criminal law proceeding, or the vindication felt by
individuals who succeed in their anti-discrimination
claim. How and why law exists in the way it does
requires us – as legal scholars, lawyers and judges – to
look more closely at the emotional infrastructure of legal
institutions (courts, parliaments, statutory authorities,
executive bureaucracies, and so on).3 Law is not just
constituted by dispassionate doctrines and prescriptive
precedents – it materialises through formalised feelings.
Once upon a disgust. . .
Many activist stories about ‘LGBTI progress’ begin by
setting the scene in relation to the decriminalisation of
homosexuality. While the last half century has witnessed
a number of countries begin their stories of progress,
laws criminalising gay sex still persist in 68 countries.
These laws – many introduced through the British
Empire’s ‘civilising missions’ – prohibit ‘carnal inter-
course against the order of nature’ and ‘gross indecency’.
These crudely drafted statutory provisions generate dis-
gust: they crystallise social revulsion towards non-
heterosexual forms of intimacy and turn gay and lesbian
people, among others, into abjected outlaws.
Even in jurisdictions where privacy has been invoked
to repeal or read down such provisions, people who
engage in sexual practices that disturb social conventions
still find themselves under the scrutiny of criminal law.
Think about Anthony Brown who, along with a few of his
lovers, was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily
harm in England during the early 1990s because he
enjoyed sadomasochist sex with multiple kinks. The
House of Lords did not mince their words in holding
Brown and his lovers culpable for assault occasioning
actual bodily harm: non-genital forms of pleasure derived
from piercing and cutting were ‘an evil thing’.4 Yet, a few
years later, the English Court of Appeal refused to apply
the precedent set in Brown when dealing with a husband
who tattooed his initials into his wife’s arse using a knife.5
Apparently, that was merely an act of ‘adornment’ rather
than intentional infliction of harm.
Disgust reveals a lot about the scope of decriminal-
isation. Privacy only works as a shield against criminal
liability when the acts performed are not too disgusting
and can be safely quarantined, away from public con-
sumption.6 Lawyers or judges wanting to challenge this
(homo)sexual policing cannot just rely on objective rea-
soning – they have to take on the disgust that animates
its existence.
Haters gonna hate!
Policing, however, has also become an emotional symbol
of LGBTI inclusion. One example of this is hate crime
legislation, which carries the promise of remedying big-
oted violence. These laws highlight a unique emotional
shift: queers move from being despised for their intima-
cies (gay sex) to being viewed as vulnerable and in need
of protecting from others who would despise them.
Homophobes – not homosexuals – become subjects of
legal hostility and social loathing.
Just take a look at the US. In the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2009 (US), the non-incorporated ‘find-
ings’ note that hate crime ‘disrupts the tranquility and
safety of communities’.7 The findings also go on to say
that such violence ‘devastates not just the actual victim
and the family and friends of the victim, but frequently
savages the community sharing the traits that caused the
victim to be selected’.8 The legislation purports to rec-
ognise the intimate associations between the victims,
families and the broader community to which such vic-
tims belong. In doing so, it imagines the national com-
munity as tolerant and inclusive and casts those who
would be liable under the Act as violent interlopers
in the community. Homophobes, instead of homosex-
uals, are now made queer to the community. In the
Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the analogising of hate crime
with ‘savagery’ stigmatises offenders as barbaric or
3For a more in-depth overview of Law and Emotion scholarship, see Terry Maroney, ‘Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field’
(2006) 30 Law and Human Behavior 119.
4R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 at 237 (Lord Templeman).
5R v Wilson [1997] QB 47 at 50 (Russell LJ, Bracewell and Capstick JJ).
6See also Kendall Thomas, ‘Beyond the Privacy Principle’ (1992) 92(6) Columbia Law Review 1431.
718 USC ss249.
8Ibid.
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uncivilised while sentimentalising the community as a
homogenous site of ‘tranquility’. In sentimentalising the
community as always already safe and welcoming, those
who express homophobia are deemed to lack self-
control.9
But, hate crimes are not just about violence that
results in serious injury or death. They are much more
banal than that. Homophobia manifests in verbal insults
hurled towards a same-sex couple who hold hands on
the street. Transphobia emerges in routine harassment
directed towards a person who does not conform to an
expected gender role.10 By directing our (righteous)
hate towards those who engage in exceptional forms
of (homo/transphobic) hate, we obscure how homo/
transphobia is a structural and social reality that per-
vades our lives.
Embracing a vengeful desire for punishment
through penalties like prison also sustains a penal
logic that already disproportionately harms marginalised
groups of people (such as the incarceration of Black
and Indigenous people, many of whom are also
queer and trans). Ironically, hate crime provisions
provide an instrument to channel our collective
hostilities towards spectacular forms of homo/transpho-
bic violence and inequality but, in redirecting our hate
towards incarcerating those we might describe as ‘hei-
nous humans’, we reproduce other forms of violence
and inequality made possible by the carceral system.11
This cautions us to resist the (understandable) public
appeals to hate through law if we are to address the
structural causes of homo/transphobic violence and
secure accountability that addresses, not entrenches,
inequality.
You can get angry
Thinking about broader forms of accountability leads me
to reflect on anti-discrimination law. Unlike criminal law
that punishes individuals, anti-discrimination law reaches
more broadly into institutions to ensure policies, pro-
cesses and procedures are conducive to promoting
inclusion. Anger has been important to make visible
the everyday experiences of discrimination faced by
LGBTI people. It is an energising emotion that pushes
us beyond the injury we have faced and to strike back
against what we perceived was the cause of it. Think
about the indignation we feel at hearing that a young
trans person has been expelled from a religious school
for seeking medical transition or the outrage we would
experience if we were unable to live with our partner in
an aged care facility. In law, this anger has facilitated the
creation of equality law to deal with public and commer-
cial exclusions.
Yet, the reach of LGBTI people’s anger is circum-
scribed by a competing set of indignant claims. Some
religious groups argue that their ‘religious freedom’ is
threatened by equality laws that force them to compro-
mise their beliefs. This is acutely apparent in the
vociferous debates around the Religious Discrimination
Bill in Australia. Broadly drafted, as a concession to some
conservative religious groups angered by the passage of
marriage equality legislation, this Bill would allow for
the exclusion of LGBT people (among other groups) in
various areas of public life.12
What strikes me emotionally about this debate is how
anger circulates between groups: from LGBT people
enraged by a law that will further intimidate them
(at work or in hospital) to religious groups that are indig-
nant about having to conform to a ‘pro-gay agenda’
(in their schools).13 And yet, while it is important to
make room to reckon with anger, we have to be mindful
of how it presents conflicts in binary terms. The
‘sexuality vs religion’ debate, as it is so often caricatured,
ignores how many queer people are also religious.
Accommodating them requires law to move past a reli-
ance on only privileged forms of anger to either include
groups or carve out exceptions. Instead, law needs to
make room for the anger of marginalised groups (queers
of faith) who challenge conditional forms of public
accommodation and social inclusion.
What are you afraid of?
Exclusion and discrimination can be violent, too, when
they happen as a result of state (in)action. Fear materi-
alises here for people who experience homo/transpho-
bic persecution and seek to leave it behind. It may seem
obvious, but fear is how we anticipate and recognise
things (for example, people, objects, situations) that
threaten us. For LGBTI people seeking asylum, fear mat-
ters legally because a grant of asylum is only possible
where someone demonstrates a ‘well-founded fear’ of
persecution because they belong to a particular social
group.14
But queer people lodging asylum claims also struggle.
They have to deal with another set of fears: a state
bureaucracy that dismisses their experiences because
they do not match up with stereotypes about what it
means to be ‘authentically gay’ (such as marching in
Pride, having many sexual partners, or listening to
Madonna). These groups of people are treated with hos-
tility and suspicion because the state fears the border is
9Leslie Moran and Beverley Skeggs, Sexuality and the Politics of Violence and Safety (Routledge, 2004) 35.
10See Gail Mason, The Spectacle of Violence: Gender, Homophobia and Knowledge (Routledge, 2002).
11Jin Haritaworn, ‘Beyond “Hate”: Queer Metonymies of Crime, Pathology, and Anti/Violence’ (2013) 4(2) Jindal Global Law Review 44, 47.
12Religious Discrimination Bill 2019 (Cth).
13Paul Karp, ‘Religious freedom bill’s latest draft “unacceptable and does not protect human rights”’, The Guardian (online, 1 February 2020) https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/01/religious-freedom-bills-latest-draft-unacceptable-and-does-not-protect-human-rights.
14Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, Article 1A(2) http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.
html.
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under threat or abuse by disingenuous people.15 For
example, in 2012, the UK government embarked on a
process of creating a ‘hostile environment’ for people
who remained in the country without a regularised
migration status. This was made possible through a
series of policy, legislative and regulatory measures that
‘showed contempt’ towards migrants.16 At the same
time, LGBT people seeking asylum in the UK were
faced with an anxious culture of disbelief when they
sought refuge. Here are the words of a Home Office
decision maker in May 2016:
It is reasonable to expect . . . you would have had a lot of
pressure and mental ordeals to overcome in realising
your sexual identity.17
In rejecting the claim, the decision maker observed that
you cannot really be gay if you have not gone through an
emotionally charged journey of self-discovery. Status
determination processes make LGBTrefugees vulnerable
to removal if they cannot account for their experiences
through ‘coming out’ stories laced with trauma and real-
isation. Bureaucratic scrutiny of LGBTasylum claims also
points to the vulnerability of an adjudication system
plagued with fears about ‘bogus’ claims that threaten
the integrity of the state.18 This scrutiny takes the
form of having to prove that you really are gay and
really scared. Fail to do that – to make an immigration
bureaucrat believe you can fit into the box marked
‘Flaming Queen’ or ‘Stone Butch’ – and you risk being
returned to persecution.
It is not just the person seeking asylum who has fears.
Political fears shape the legal infrastructures that govern
adjudication of asylum claims. Screening interviews, strict
statutory or jurisprudential criteria on authenticating
who is ‘really’ gay and in need of protection, detention
practices and limited judicial review expose underlying
legal fears that ‘opening the floodgates’ will compromise
the integrity of the refugee system. Following fears in the
asylum system exposes why so many LGBT people are
denied protection. And fighting those fears is important
if we are to support those who seek refuge.
Deal with your anxieties
Anxieties related to policing borders and identities also
emerge in other areas of law, such as those relating to
medicalising sex and gender. We can observe this in how
young trans people’s desires to medically transition gen-
erate a mix of legal caring and anxiousness. In Australia,
for example, minors have had to appeal to the welfare
jurisdiction of the Family Court of Australia to undergo
medical or surgical changes to alleviate their ‘gender dys-
phoria’. In approving virtually every application and, most
recently, dispensing with the requirement for minors to
seek court approval, the Family Court has oscillated
between compassion and anxiety when addressing anx-
ieties faced by trans children and formulating therapeutic
interventions to relieve those anxieties.
This began in Re Alex when a prepubescent trans boy,
Alex, was granted puberty blockers and cross-sex hor-
mones to assist with his transition. The decision in Re
Alex manifested an anxiety over a failure to provide treat-
ment to young trans people by noting that a failure to
affirm Alex’s coherent gender identity would severely
compromise his health. Nicholson J embraced submis-
sions relating to Alex’s gender identity and proposals for
his treatment but remained anxious over giving young
trans people the capacity to make important decisions
over their bodies without court supervision.19
Almost a decade later, Re Jamie involved approving a
young girl’s application for treatment to suspend the
onset of ‘male puberty’. By focusing on gender dysphoria
and the exigencies of treatment, the Family Court in Re
Jamie expressed anxieties over a failure to affirm the
gender identity of young trans people and the irrevers-
ible consequences of treatment. Dessau J’s reasoning
made visible the vulnerability of trans minors to self-
harm, suicidal ideation and emotional distress, and
these acknowledgments of harms prompted the justice
to agree to puberty blockers.20 Yet, Dessau J also
expressed anxiety over predicting Jamie’s future gender
identification and held that Jamie would need to seek
further court authorisation for cross-sex hormones,
noting Jamie’s best interests as an adolescent could not
be pre-determined as she was 10 years old at the time.21
Such reasoning alleviated broader judicial anxieties over
irreversible bodily modifications and shifting gender
identifications while recognising that medical treatment
was central to Jamie’s wellbeing in this case.
Finally, Re Kelvin affirmed the petition of a teenage boy
who requested access to testosterone therapy to ‘mas-
culinise’ his body and held court authorisation was no
longer necessary for such interventions. In arriving at
this historic decision, the Court had to alleviate the anx-
ieties enacted in Re Jamie about the risks associated with
treatment and if a child (who lacked capacity to consent)
changed their mind after an irreversible procedure. The
majority began their judgment by noting in careful detail
the clinical criteria that underpinned a diagnosis of
15Jenni Millbank, ‘Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada and Australia’ (2002) 26(7) Melbourne University Law Review
144.
16Frances Webber, ‘On the creation of the UK’s “hostile environment”’ (2019) 60(4) Race & Class 76, 77.
17UKLGIG, Still Falling Short: The Standard of Home Office Decision-Making in Asylum Claims Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Web Page, July
2018) 18 https://uklgig.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Still-Falling-Short.pdf.
18Didier Fassin, ‘The Precarious Truth of Asylum’ (2013) 25(1) Public Culture 39.
19Re Alex [2004] FamCAFC 297 at [173] (Nicholson J).
20Re Jamie [2013] FamCAFC 110 at [60] (Dessau J).
21Ibid at [130].
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gender dysphoria and emphasising that it was a state of
‘distress’, one which could ‘lead to anxiety, depression,
self-harm and attempted suicide’.22 Such individual vul-
nerabilities were alleviated by medical and legal care:
distress over one’s gender could be addressed with med-
ical affirmation and legal recognition of that gender iden-
tity. These general statements about their therapeutic
value were then connected to Kelvin’s particular situa-
tion. Thackray, Strickland, and Murphy JJ writing as the
majority noted how the medical interventions he had
been able to access so far had improved his mental
health and that hormone treatment would offer another
means to ‘relieve his suffering’.23 In making these state-
ments, the Court departed significantly from Nicholson
J’s initial concern in Re Alex about characterising trans
subjectivity in terms of ‘disorder’ or ‘malfunction’. The
Court made space to affirm Kelvin’s gender identity but
only to the extent that his gender identity was governed
by prevailing medical and psychological norms.
The decisions relating to the medical treatment of
trans children make palpable the disparate ways that anx-
iety and care ultimately shape the recognition of gender
identity of young trans people along with their capacity
to consent to medical treatment. On one hand, the
court is concerned about the health and wellbeing of
trans minors and seeks, where possible, to give effect
to the voices of young trans people through caring judg-
ments that affirm the therapeutic necessity of medical
transition to ‘cure’ gender dysphoria. On the other
hand, young trans people must alleviate the court’s anx-
iety, that they may change their minds in the future, by
subscribing to a psychological truth about their gender
and demonstrate this truth by performing particular
gender stereotypes associated with that gender (which
include their toy, clothing and bodily preferences). We
need courts to deal with their own anxieties if they are
to make room to affirm trans and non-binary children
who refuse to fit binary categories of gender.
Hold back on the pity and compassion
Intersex people also endure a problematic mix of anxi-
ety, pity and compassion. Pathologised as a ‘disorder of
sexual development’, the medicalisation of intersex
bodies reveals how social anxieties over indeterminacy
render infants susceptible to coercive, non-therapeutic
surgical interventions. In other words, surgical interven-
tions are legally permissible without consent or over-
sight because they are compassionately desirable to
‘repair’ bodies with obscure, mixed or absent sex to
make them appear functionally ‘normal’.24 Physical
health, however, is rarely the primary concern when
deciding on treatment methods. Most surgical decisions
are based on whether a penis will appear ‘normal’ to
others or whether a vagina will be ‘penetrable’ and
therefore capable of functioning in heterosexual inter-
course. While there is no unanimity to medical criteria
to determine sex or consistency in approach among sur-
geons seeking to intervene, what is clear is that clinical
decision-making becomes an anxious exercise in fashion-
ing social, rather than physical, wellbeing.25
Medical anxieties function in the absence of legal reg-
ulation as ‘authority’ to conceal the ways clinicians push
an ideological agenda about gender under the guise of
patient care. The wishes of intersex people in relation to
their health or wellbeing become secondary to a broader
medical narrative that refuses to imagine bodily diversity
which threatens the coherence of social systems that
determine sex through the reproductive pairing of
male/female.
Law makes this permissible through its silence and
refusal to legislate. For us to challenge this, we need to
ensure law is able to stop privileging the gender anxieties
of medical practitioners (and to some extent the parents
of intersex children) and their ‘compassionate’ interven-
tions above the needs and desires of intersex people
who seek to protect their bodily integrity and ability
to make informed decisions.
#LoveWins
Our story of progress often concludes with the realisa-
tion of love, prized through the achievement of marriage
equality. In the case that led to constitutionalising mar-
riage equality in the US, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it
embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sac-
rifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people
become something greater than once they were. As some
of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage
embodies a love that may endure even past death. It
would misunderstand these men and women to say
they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that
they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek
to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not
to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one
of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dig-
nity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them
that right.26
In his judgment, now canonised on social media, mar-
riage was idealised as the means for same-sex couples
to realise the full promise of their intimacy. Marriage
would rescue individuals from alienation, singledom and
loneliness. We can see here how love of liberty, hope for
22Re Kelvin II [2017] FamCAFC 258 at [19] (Thackray, Strickland, and Murphy JJ).
23Ibid at [37 and 47].
24Re Carla (a medical procedure) [2016] FamCA 7.
25Morgan Carpenter, ‘The “Normalization” of Intersex Bodies and the “Othering” of Intersex Identities in Australia’ (2018) 15 Bioethical Inquiry 487.
26Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015), at 25 (Kennedy, Sotomayor, Breyer, Kagan, and Ginsburg JJ).
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equality, respect for dignity emerge as emotional and
constitutional principles. The poetic nature of the judg-
ment has an undeniable appeal. It sentimentalises the
pursuit of marriage equality as one capable of delivering
personal and social transformation. I, like many others,
washed my profile photo on Facebook in rainbows when
the decision was handed down. Yet, the ways in which
these loving and hopeful claims are judicialised warrants
critical attention. The constitutional love of liberty here
only confers recognition on monogamous couples – it
does not reach to queers who live in polyamorous rela-
tionships or remain single.27 The presentation of mar-
riage equality as hope for a better future ignores how
queer and trans folks (of colour in particular) experience
destitution, violence and poverty, irrespective of their
marital status.28
Love in law, however, need not be so limited. In the
judgment that led to the decriminalisation of gay sex in
India, the Supreme Court of India sent a valentine to the
LGBT community by promising them a future built on
nourishment, reciprocity, inclusion and dignity. Chief
Justice Dipak Misra observed that the penal law which
prohibited same-sex conduct eroded the ‘right to
choose without fear’ a partner and realise ‘a basic right
to companionship’.29 He added, ‘the rights of the LGBT
community inhere in the right to life, dwell in privacy and
dignity and they constitute the essence of liberty and
freedom.’30 The constitution was a way to nourish indi-
viduals – ‘the painting of humanity’ – a document that
could cultivate the affective and intimate capacities of the
people it governed. Unlike other cases which dealt with
sexuality in privatising terms, this judgment elevated
LGBT people through loving references about the
importance of preserving their identities and intimacies
in public life, as related to employment, housing, social
association, and so on. Love in law need not be narrow.
We can embrace critical and capacious expressions of
love that make space for LGBTI people.
Let me get this gay. . .
‘We need to pour contempt on emotion’. This was the
critical feedback I received from a former judge and
barrister during the launch of my book earlier this
year.31 For this individual, the heightened focus on emo-
tion risked turning the practice of law into one of radical
subjectivism, inimical to reason. But the earnestness of
his last comment made me pause to wonder how the
irony of it – using emotion to talk about why we
shouldn’t talk about emotion in law – could be missed
by such an experienced legal professional. This is not
meant as a criticism of that judge. Rather, it illuminates
the hostility that we – as legal scholars and lawyers –
have in talking about our feelings in our work. This is not
surprising given how most law schools train us in doc-
trinal forms of analysis and legal practice encourages us
to see our work as intellectual, rather than emotional,
exercises of reasoning.
We need to think more affectively about law, rights
and reform to better understand all three. We can do
that by thinking, and talking more about, our feelings
critically. We need to develop our legal vocabularies,
tactics in litigation and strategies of reform to take
account of how emotion makes the pursuit of LGBTI
rights possible. Law cannot escape emotion. And neither
should we.
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